tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27584252.post1091071332412412447..comments2024-03-22T18:15:47.666+11:00Comments on Boy on a bike: Continuing the "soldiers" themeUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27584252.post-37581308620317012962008-10-25T01:45:00.000+11:002008-10-25T01:45:00.000+11:00Concur with Sharpie in that East Timor in 99 gave ...Concur with Sharpie in that East Timor in 99 gave the complacent pollies, penny pinching public service and half asleep career officers a bloody big fright on seeing just how far the sharp end of the army had been allowed to run down, and how quick a full blown emergency could develop.<BR/><BR/>Shits were trumps, to resurrect an old military saying.BlueyMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00881325160922619283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-27584252.post-11549330824368538582008-10-23T13:19:00.000+11:002008-10-23T13:19:00.000+11:00I was in the army during the Beazley days, so I co...I was in the army during the Beazley days, so I concur with all you’ve said about equipment standards at the time. In the early 90s we were still training to re-fight the Vietnam War, with equipment, tactics and doctrine from that era. The uniforms had changed colour, and the individual weapon had been changed, but the vast bulk of the equipment had most likely seen service in South Vietnam. There are two aspects to the parlous equipment state in the ADF at that time though. The first and easiest to address is the poor funding that defence is traditionally allocated by ALP governments. It stems from the hangover from Vietnam that the ADF were the tools of Western Imperialism, and as such should be kept at home with minimal funding. The Federal Budget had better uses than procuring new equipment. There were important social programs to support, throwing money at ATSIC for example. The second aspect is related to the first. During Beazley’s time, the prevailing strategic mindset was the Defence of Australia Doctrine that held that the ADF was a force only to be used in defence of the Australian mainland. This focused spending towards RAAF and Navy to protect the air/sea gap to the north. Army was left with enough to sustain current capability, but only just enough. With no new strategic direction, the army stagnated into the predominantly light infantry mindset that had existed from the 50s. Tactics, techniques and procedures evolved at a snail’s pace and remained astonishingly similar to what had existed at the end of the Vietnam War. No real thought went into equipment procurement, because no real thought went into long term strategic planning. The equipment we had was satisfactory for what we were doing, which to be honest, wasn’t very much.<BR/><BR/>Things have changed quite significantly, partly because we had 12 years of a conservative government who saw the need to increase the allocation to defence in the budget. The other driver has been the deployments that have occurred since 1996. Back in the day, the only people you saw with medals that weren’t 15 years of undetected crime were Vietnam Vets and the odd lucky bastard who snagged a UN trip. It didn’t really improve after 1 RAR went to Somalia and 2/4 RAR went to Rwanda either. The catalyst for change was East Timor. The main effort for change has been Iraq/Afghanistan. We now have top-of-the-line gear for deployed forces. From body armour, to sensor systems, everything is top notch. The cynic in me says that this is mainly due to reluctance on the part of any government to see the press leaping on an equipment issue as the cause for a soldier coming home in a bag, but there have been astute decisions made about synchronising procurement to strategic outcomes. The flow-on is that training equipment is much better now as well.<BR/><BR/>Your comments about fatigue are spot on. The new generation of military technology actually makes it worse. In the past, when the sun went down the war stopped, or at least slowed down. Night vision equipment issued down to individual soldiers now means we have a 24 hour battlefield in a more real sense than ever before. It makes things very unpleasant for the bad guys, but drains our guys. It also drives TTP. Do you remember some spanker running around outside your perimeter in the middle of the night firing random shots and obscenities? That guy dies now. Before he even gets a chance to locate your guns a little green dot has appeared on his forehead, rapidly followed by a 5.56mm hole. The target indication is “Reference dead guy…” Newer weapon systems also mean that there are two gunners in a section now, with the additional ammunition burden that brings. Improved load carrying equipment is also a boon that giveth and it taketh away. The better your LCE, the more shite you are expected to carry. In a modern battlefield in a hot climate, that means enough water to slake the thirst of a small village (or a soldier in body armour in 50 degree heat). It means batteries for individual comms equipment, radios to section level, Night Fighting Equipment, and CES for each and every gadget designed to make you a more efficient soldier. The olds and bolds yearn for the days of the old Vietnam era pack that would only fit a ration pack, two water bottles and a raincoat psychological. Those yearnings disappear very quickly when it pisses rain and out comes a jacket/pants Gore-Tex combo.<BR/><BR/>The short answer is that yes equipment has come a long way from your time and my early days running around shouting bang at each other and sending contact reports in trigram code on an ANPRC77 set. With every advantage new equipment brings, there’s always a down side. The key in procurement is balancing the two whilst still giving our soldiers the very best capability, protection, and just sometimes, comfort.Richard Sharpehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07042576335471857838noreply@blogger.com